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ECONOMIC TRACTS. No. XVIII.

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PATRIOTISM

AND

NATIONAL DEFENCE

BY

CHARLES H. HALL, D.D.

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

NEW YORK

THE SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION

31 PARK ROW

1885

The Society for Political Education.

(*ORGANIZED* 1880.)

OBJECTS.—The SOCIETY was organized by citizens who believe that the success of our government depends on the active political influence of educated intelligence, and that parties are means, not ends. It is entirely non-partisan in its organization and is not to be used for any other purpose than the awakening of an intelligent interest in government methods and purposes, tending to restrain the abuse of parties and to promote party morality.

Among its organizers are numbered Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, who differ among themselves as to which party is best fitted to conduct the government; but who are in the main agreed as to the following propositions:

The right of each citizen to his free voice and vote must be upheld.

Office-holders must not control the suffrage.

The office should seek the man, and not the man the office.

Public service, in business positions, should depend solely on fitness and good behavior.

The crimes of bribery and corruption must be relentlessly punished.

Local issues should be independent of national parties.

Coins made unlimited legal tender must possess their face value as metal in the markets of the world.

Sound currency must have a metal basis, and all paper-money must be convertible on demand.

Labor has a right to the highest wages it can earn, unhindered by public or private tyranny.

Trade has a right to the freest scope, unfettered by taxes, except for government expenses.

Corporations must be restricted from abuse of privilege.

Neither the public money nor the people's land must be used to subsidize private enterprise.

A public opinion, wholesome and active, unhampered by machine control, is the true safeguard of popular institutions.

Persons who become members of the Society are not, however, required to endorse the above.

METHODS.—The Society proposes to carry out its objects by submitting from time to time to its members lists of books which it regards as desirable reading on current political and economic questions; by selecting annual courses of reading for its members; by supplying the books so selected at the smallest possible advance beyond actual cost; by furnishing and circulating at a low price, and in cheap form, sound economic and political literature in maintenance and illustration of the principles above announced as constituting the basis of its organization; and by assisting in the formation of reading and corresponding circles and clubs for discussing social, political, and economic questions.

ORGANIZATION.—The Society is managed by a General Committee, selected from different sections of the United States. The correspondence of the Society is divided among five Secretaries, one each for the East, the Northwest, the Southeast, the Southwest, and the Pacific Slope.

It is suggested that branch organizations be formed wherever it is possible (and especially in colleges) to carry out the intentions of the Society. Any person who will form a Club of ten persons, each of whom shall be an active member of this Society, will be entitled to a set of the tracts already issued.

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PATRIOTISM AND NATIONAL DEFENCE.

By Charles H. HALL, D.D., Brooklyn, N. Y.

Nothing can be more undesirable than war, except the dishonor which a nation seeks to avoid by accepting it as the lesser evil. Nothing is more opposite to all that constitutes a prosperous republic. In a monarchy it is quite possible that the pride, selfishness, or greed of a few may precipitate great evils which must be borne chiefly by the common masses, while the aristocracy and the court reap the benefits; but in a republican form of government the injury must be endured by those who originally decide for the use of violent remedies. Usually in a healthy condition of public opinion, the *ultima ratio* will be delayed as long as may be compatible with sound principles of honor. It is in its nature more the *ratio regum*, than the instinct of democracies, however fierce they may be. The government which belongs to the few will invariably be inclined to cultivate the sense of *force*, inasmuch as such governments require constantly the exhibition of it to control the many, who as they are or become intelligent discover the inconsequence and impropriety of the organization which gives to the few superior advantages, and to the great majority the privilege only of toiling to create such privileges for those who imagine themselves superiors. The war instinct is inherent in all forms of governments

which are founded on any narrow platform, since those who cannot be trusted to govern themselves by reason must be governed ostensibly by force, and the existence of that force must be paraded and trained to constant preparation for activity. Hence, like all trained activities, the instinct of the parties so trained is to make themselves felt. Great bodies of troops kept in readiness for resistance to corresponding forces, whether in the kingdom in the form of mob violence, insurrection, or civil war, excited by the ambitious minority of the aristocracy, which minority always exists as latent or apparent,—or for resistance of other armies in neighboring kingdoms, must accept, nay the strongest passions of men teach them to accept, a state of war, as more or less advantageous to themselves, however great its evils may be to the masses of their fellow-subjects. Among the instincts which marked the forecast of the lawgiver of the Israelites was the precept that forbade the keeping and raising of horses by the tribes, lest the existence of the power should be a temptation to engage in foreign wars. The same consciousness of power became the sin of the first warlike king of that people, as manifested in his unhappy attempt to obtain a census of the nation, to increase his pride, and become the temptation of his successors. The nations of the Old World have and still cherish the dependence upon standing armies, as the legitimate correlative of the *jus divinum* of kings. In English history it appears that the revolution which destroyed for all time the divine right of the Stuarts to rule over the nation, engendered at once the national aversion to standing armies. From the year of grace 1688, historians date the origin of this aversion. Its growth has been parallel to the increase of personal liberty in the masses of the people, and the gradual but steady growth of the sense of general equality of all

men before the law. In England this feeling has expressed itself thus far, in the practical reassertion of the permanent rights of the people as represented in the House of Commons, and the insensible evolution in many ways of the old maxim of English liberty, that the Englishman is bound by no laws that he does not originally consent to by acts of legislation. The inconsistencies that confuse the record among that people are due largely to the accidents of hereditary kingship and to their surroundings. Their thoughtful men are disturbed by the difficulties that such sophisms as they use impose upon them.

The American colonies, removed from such surroundings, were compelled by circumstances to act independently by consulting the actual physical powers of all the colonists. They inherited the aversion to standing armies, and really worked themselves into virtual self-dependence long before they were driven by necessity into the proclamation of its axioms. Perhaps no single man illustrated this silent growth into this unconscious conviction of the rights of all men to share in the government over them, and to assert themselves, better than the famous Virginian orator, Patrick Henry. His first effort in eloquence, which has for us the fascination of the opening scenes of a drama, was his plea in the parson's case in 1763. Henry as a lawyer was altogether wrong in that case. He accepted the brief, which no respectable lawyer in the province could have allowed himself to plead, and only after it had been thrown up by counsel, as untenable. But though inadmissible in law, it offered the half-taught and briefless attorney an opportunity of appeal to the higher law, to which his neighbors discovered, to their amazement, that they were approaching. The justice of the parson's claim to his tobacco-salary, on the same terms on which all others received their rates,

and the injustice of the act of the colonial assembly in passing an *ex-parte* law against him, vanished before the fervid imagination of the orator, which dwelt upon the preceding evils to which the body of the clergy had lent themselves as factors and patrons, and swayed the court and the auditors of his brilliant eloquence to a decision which, it is said, Henry himself never afterward ventured to excuse. There had been growing up in the minds of men that great principle, then antagonizing the parson's special privileges. It soon passed into attacks upon the tyranny of the king and Parliament in his famous Resolution upon the Stamp Act. Henry's place in our history, and the charm which still lingers in the imperfect records of his eloquence, lies in the fact, that he dared to utter, and uttered wisely, the feelings which resulted in the Revolution. A few years later, those maxims of liberty which he uttered became the possession of all men,—not because he or others invented them. They had been growing in the minds of the masses of the colonists, who, after the peace with Great Britain, only expressed in legal forms the rules by which they had always been trained by circumstances.* When the colonies became united states, with a settled form of

* His famous utterances in defence of his resolutions for calling out the militia in 1775, that "the colony be immediately put in a state of defence," have been the creed of all American school-boys since. "There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston. The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms. I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death." The dilemma thus sharply put leaves no alternative. His word *liberty* signified no new or radical changes in the form of government, for he was asserting the rights of Englishmen under the law, but of Englishmen who had grown up to self-dependence and support, under the mild neglect of an indifferent home government.

government, they accepted the Englishman's aversion to standing armies, and what the Englishman tardily accepts —the aversion to privileged classes. At least that is our *experiment*, as he would call it. If ours is the natural and best form of government, as we believe it to be, it is but fair that we insist upon his error in enduring his dilemma too long.

For us as republicans war is the last of evils ; with a single exception—that is, when we accept national dishonor in order to avoid it. The loss of self-respect in an individual is ruinous. Sooner or later the consciousness of voluntary dishonor becomes a cancer, that eats away all virtues. Virtue in its real sense was well taken from the old Roman word *virtus*, *i. e.*, manhood. Destroy the roots of manhood by removing self-respect, and one is or becomes a sham, a hypocrite or a villain ; wound it in essentials, and while he carries about a wounded self-respect, he is a sick man. His virtues are sickly and moribund. Now multiply this by the virile census of a nation that has failed in the courage to assert itself on proper occasion, which has lost the opportunity by lack of preparation, or betrayed suicidal folly in wild extravagance or in mercenary cowardice, and the nation has the choice between shame and decay—shame at its sense of universal degradation, or decay in the true stimulus to noble life, which is the sense of unimpaired honor. That is a greater curse to bear than the losses and burdens of war.

I am inclined to emphasize the evils of war—at least I am not to be supposed in any thing that I may say hereafter as inclined to cast any veil over them. There are two modes of viewing them : that of the believer in the One whose grand title is the Prince of Peace, and that of the patriotic statesman, who looks at them from the

standpoint of intelligent self-interest. The first abhors all thoughts of war, as utterly opposed to the virtues, usages, interests, and duties, alike of the individual and the community. He is inclined to emphasize the teachings of inspiration, which make for peace and for those things whereby one may edify another. He asks with the sacred writer: "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence even of your lusts, that war in your members? Ye lust and have not; ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain; ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not." This is a noble and truthful description of the times of that writer, when wars and fightings had no place in real statesmanship, but were the outcome of the lusts of ambitious rulers and restless demagogues. The most enthusiastic Christian can urge these precepts no further than to the point where the choice of an enlightened community lies plainly between war and dishonor. The great Teacher has said of the world as it was in his day: "Think not that I am come to send peace on the earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword." Through the continued and bloody struggles between good and evil he saw his kingdom as slowly arising by means of individual suffering, that could be accepted without dishonor—not by national dishonor and disgrace. The Church in all ages has been compelled to accept this modification of its love of peace, and has relegated its actual possession to the perfections of a yet distant future.

The statesman,—nay, every wise man,—who finds himself obliged to reason from "the progress of events," is rightly inclined to consider war as the greatest of evils. Its destruction of the enjoyments of peace; its injury to all the ordinary avocations of a prosperous community; its suspension of common laws and its necessary allow-

ance of license, even at the best; its laborious sacrifice of human health and strength; its murders and slaughters; its vast expense in life and substance; and its resulting debasement of morals, even when victory has crowned the struggle—on any side, on every side, he finds it an evil—an evil only less intolerable than ruinous and disgraceful submission to national falsehood and shame.

The dreams of the New England colonists along the Connecticut valley were never darker than when the startled sleepers awoke with the war-whoop of the French-Indian raids; but the story would have been sadder now, if the piety and good sense of the Puritans had not alike taught them that their duty and their safety was to fight. Such wars and fightings came not of their lusts, but of their manhood. This, in a nutshell, contains the solution of all doubtful disputations on the peace question. Nothing that I shall say can diminish the ardor with which we most devoutly pray: "Lord, send peace in our time."

With this introduction I propose to discuss, in a practical manner, certain points that are worthy of general consideration. Wars have always occurred with a tendency to periodicity—enough so, at all events, to require no prophet to tell us that they will probably occur again; enough so to show that we cannot yet beat our swords into ploughshares, nor neglect the duties of preparation, both of material resources and of the virtues of courage to use them promptly and successfully.

I divide the subject of this preparation under the five following heads—with the single remark, that my purpose is to suggest thoughts to others, rather than to work up thoroughly any single point. I suggest them:

1. That war is an art, founded on scientific principles, which have been demonstrated by ages of painful and costly effort.

2. That this art and these principles have been obscured and hindered in this nation by mistaken and misapplied conceptions of the teachings of Christianity.

3. That the same obstruction and error have been produced by a general notion that noisy speech and chance efforts of valor may be substituted in the place of vigorous and comprehensive mastering of the art of war.

4. The reader will be invited to consider the army work of the countries of civilized Europe, under the three heads : of 1—its vast expense ; 2—its loss of happiness ; and 3—its injury to morals.

5. We must look at the contrast that is presented in our country, and then conclude the argument by suggesting the inevitable duties that make patriotism to be, with us, a recognition of certain facts, which are : 1—using the lamp of experience, and doing it with a clear conscience as to its being right ; 2—doing it seriously, as unavoidable ; 3—doing it willingly and cheerfully, lest the State may be compelled to use harsh measures, and pass laws of conscription.

I remark, then, first, that war is an art, founded on scientific principles, which have been evolved and demonstrated by ages of painful and costly effort. I take as my authority for this assertion, an extract from an essay in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* (vol. iv., no. xiii., p. 41), which has received the approval of some of our wisest general officers. "War," says the writer, "is, above all things, an art employing science in all its branches as its servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the artisan. It has its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable." Jomini, a good authority, has divided the art of war into five sections, as Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. Under the general title would come also all

the preparations for the actual struggle, which are assigned to Congress by the Constitution of the United States. They include the numbers of men to be enlisted, their assignment to different arms of the service, the arrangements of companies, regiments, and brigades, the number and ranks of officers, the times of service ; commissary equipment, medical attendance ; provisions for their and the country's defence by the construction and maintenance of barracks, forts, and all constructions and conveniences. Before these, too, are required, there are other matters of preparation—namely, the procuring of arms, ammunition, etc., the education in military science in schools, as at West Point and Annapolis, and, as is claimed by many statesmen, the construction of railways and highways for the transport of troops.*

It is not my purpose to enter into these details, but to found on this postulate the averment that, first, the greatest difference is apparent between the nation which is fully and wisely prepared and skilled in this important security, and the nation that is unwisely ignorant of it, or indifferent to it. And, secondly, I remark that every advancement in this art is in the line of saving human life, and, paradoxical as it may sound, that every new invention or perfecting of the means of destroying enemies, has been the sure removal of the issues of war from the brute violence of carnage to the salutary adjustments of mind and reason. In old times, soldiers, when they were mingled together on the battle-field, knew of victory only by the heaps of the slain, and, stirred by angry passions, secured their conquest by indiscriminate massacre. Now,

* See "Constitutional Law," Pomeroy, pp. 291, 292. They who remember the days when the national capital had but a single-track railroad connecting it with the rest of the world, and the Potomac with its rebel batteries, can feel the importance of this last item.

it happens that a general, overlooking the whole field, discovers in time that the battle is decided by strategy or superior tactics, and withholds his forces from unnecessary bloodshed.

In the ancient battle of the Sabis, B.C. 57, between Cæsar and the Nervii, we read that "out of 600 senators there survived but three ; out of 60,000 men able to bear arms, only 500." In the seven battles around Cold Harbor, from the 1st to the 3rd of June, 1864, it appears that out of an army of perhaps 90,000 men, the total of casualties was a little less than 10,000, and the losses of the whole war were but 13 per cent. Of course the comparison is rough and faulty. It is given simply to indicate the change from the frightful destruction of ancient contests.

Now, allowing a margin for all the accidents of a campaign that are unforeseen, and for the providence that does not always give the race to the swift nor the battle to the strong, there is abundant evidence that usually they who seek to win in a race must be swift, and they who engage in a battle must cherish the advantages of trained strength. Some racers may be favorites of the gods of accidents ; some city walls may have fallen before the blast of rams' horns. Still, other things being equal, the results of military engagements are, as a rule, proportioned to the force and skill employed.

France was scientific as to war, but just corrupted enough by carelessness and pompous boasting to lose Sedan and Metz. Two weeks after the declaration of war in 1870, nearly half a million of thoroughly trained German soldiers advanced in a body across the frontier of France. There was no room left for chance. They had mastered the scientific principles of the art by painful and costly efforts, under the sense of a necessity which had

been taught them, if not of a revenge that had been stimulated in them by the injuries of the first Napoleon. One has but to glance at certain unreadiness and blunders and losses at the opening of our civil war, to feel very deeply the contrast that our records supply.

We labor under the mistake, which seems a witty saying, that the victory always falls to the general who makes the fewest blunders. This is in a measure true, but at the same time, the man who has most knowledge of his art and the most intelligent faculty of using it, and is known to have it, is the one who eliminates the chances of blunders in advance. When we see one general always opposing his enemy at every point with greater numbers, or with his men securely entrenched, we only need to have enough instances to determine that he is superior to chance. He may be lucky once or twice, but when he is found always to do the same thing, and is always on the right spot, with his men rested and his trenches dry, he is a great general ; he is master of the art of war.

We are apt to fancy, again, that the noisy musket or cannon is the *ultima ratio*—and in a sense it is so,—but during the late war it struck me with strange force, that we in the 19th century had been forced back on the old tactics of the Roman legion, and had rediscovered the value of the spade and mattock in war. And this recalls the campaign which Froude, I think, rightly terms " the most daring feat in the military annals of mankind," which illustrates the real character of the art of war as founded on science, and showing the province of the artisan. It is the great siege of Alesia in Gaul, into which city Cæsar had at last driven Vercingetorix. The latter commanded a vast force of powerful, brave, hardy, and energetic men. The former opposed him under great disadvantages,—with fewer men, and not stronger in

physical power, not more hardy, nor more enthusiastic; in fact, with no single trait of superiority, except the one matter of skill in the art of war. It was a triumph almost solely of skill, discipline, and art over immensely superior physical forces. Alesia was situated on a hill, with all the advantages of position, and was impregnable except to famine. Eighty thousand soldiers were shut up within its walls, by a Roman army of 50,000. Cæsar enclosed the town with trenches and block houses eleven miles in circuit, and shut up the Gauls in a net that they could not break. Vercingetorix sent out swift horsemen through Gaul to rouse the tribes to a sense of his danger. The Romans, divining his plan, at once began a second outer circumvallation to keep off the coming foes. Thirty days passed, and Cæsar found himself enveloped by a vast army of 250,000 men, besides the 80,000 men within the walls. As Froude says: "They were not weak Asiatics, but European soldiers, as strong and as brave as the Italians." It was the triumph of mind opposed to matter, of skill, discipline, foresight, and science over their opposites. Cæsar conquered both armies, and the subjugation of Gaul was complete. There is nothing like it in history. When we read that, in the 14th century, forty knights in France, on horseback and in mail, dispersed (if they did) 40,000 peasants and massacred 9,000 of them; or again, when we learn from Prescott that Cortez in Mexico, in 1519, with his few hundred iron-clad Spaniards, withstood and tired out 80,000 Tlascalans; admitting the full margin of doubt in each case, we perceive that the success was due to the armor, the coat of mail, and the superior strength of arm, more than to mind or art. There was only brute ignorance, furious enthusiasm, and blind hatred opposed to steel-clad men who were as impregnable as crocodiles. It was very

much as the rocks of Mount Desert receive the surges of the ocean—and are only rocks after all. Had there been a grain of art in either case, were it only the art of Attila, of avoiding walled towns and fortresses, and wearying out the enemy by the mere force of numbers, the result would have been different. In our civil war it was superior numbers that made it a foregone conclusion. But for the dream which the South indulged in, that the European nations would be forced to interfere in their behalf before the greatness of the territory, compared with the sparseness of the inhabitants, should be overcome and occupied by the North, one can see no justification, in a military point of view, for the rashness of the outbreak. Add to it only the happy-go-lucky spirit which North and South alike considered to be the real art of war, and we can explain their rashness.

Next I turn to the second point, that this art and these principles have been obscured and hindered in this nation by mistaken and misapplied conceptions of the teachings of Christianity. As a matter of fact, there exists throughout our country a gentle spirit of amiable piety, which considers all war to be wholly and totally unjustifiable in all cases, and as entirely and absolutely condemned by true religion. There may be saving exception in favor of a defensive war, *pro aris et focis*. Now there is just enough of error mixed up with this conception of war to seriously diminish and damp any zeal for a proper preparation for the inevitable. I must pass over much that might be said on this subject; not that I am afraid to discuss it, but it would require too much space. As citizens we can certainly accept facts, however much we may wish them to be otherwise. I refer, then, briefly to St. Paul's precept to men in Rome, to be subject to the powers that be, and to his assertion

that "they bear not the sword in vain." The powers which were then in being in the empire of Rome—which meant about the whole world—all issued from the *Imperator*, whom we call Emperor, and whom they knew chiefly as the head of the legions. They were peculiarly military powers, to which Christians were advised to be obedient.

As citizens we owe a duty to the sovereign authority of our country, which resides in the Constitution, and which has recognized on sound principles that the military art is among the duties of patriotism. The Second Article of that document declares the President to be "the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States." The Second Amendment uses this language: "A well-regulated militia *being necessary to the security of a free state*, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The 8th Section of Article I. specifies among the powers of Congress the following: "11. To declare war, etc.; 12. To raise and support armies; 13. To provide and maintain a Navy; 14. To regulate and govern all forces; 15. To provide for the calling forth of the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, * * * and the training of the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." We do not mean to say that this Constitution makes all this right. We do say that it recognizes the necessity of a "well-regulated militia to the security of a free state," and in this case necessity is its own law.

Now it is not to be denied that there has been and is still existing a feeling, which voices itself in many ways,—

in peace societies, in essays of an amiable type, in the songs of poets, and in sermons numberless,—which interferes directly or indirectly with the constitutional duties of military service. Nothing cripples men so much as a latent doubt of the right of their actions. Certainly nothing interferes more with honest enthusiasm, which is important in training a regular force for the security of a free State, than a constant, passive, negative dissent, a shrugging of the shoulder, a coolness to the patriotic zeal which has claimed in all ages and countries to be heroism.

The late Senator Sumner, who in 1845 was a young barrister in Boston, delivered the Fourth of July oration there, and produced, perhaps, the ablest peace-essay of the times. Of course, as was his wont, he exhausted the argument of that side with all manner of precedents and logical formulæ. His oration is to be had now in the form of a tract of the Peace Society. The elemental idea of his discourse was in harmony with these lines of Longfellow, who claims that had the wealth spent on camps and courts been given to redeem the human mind from error—

> "There were no needs of arsenals and forts;
> The warrior's name would be a name abhorred!
> And every nation that should lift again
> Its hand against a brother, on its forehead
> Would wear forevermore the curse of Cain."

One feels that it is very bold to doubt the force of the one or to doubt the poetic fervor of the other. Still to both I venture to reply, that wealth has not been so given, and the human mind has not been so redeemed, and therefore we may put off that cursing-and-Cain talk to the future. If we seek the cause of that emotional poetry in Boston just at that time, we come on the fact that New England was then thoroughly opposed to the

Mexican War, and therefore its moral, political, and financial indignation found a natural vent in this way. We may find in the earlier Biglow papers the echoes of those old cries of people who shrieked—

> "They 've sucked us right into a mis'erble war
> That no one on airth aint responsible for;
> They 've run us a hundred cool millions in debt."

Facts have triumphed since then over the logic and the poesy. Boston Common has rung with other sounds since then, and Sumner, as well as many another man who heard his eloquent words, found in 1861 other considerations to be necessary to the security of a free State. To put it in a word, this anti-war feeling offers to prove too much. If war is *ipso facto* a sin, always and everywhere, then all preparation looking that way is sinful. Constitutional clauses, acts of Legislature that enroll militia, a Congress that raises a standing army, military academies, forts, ships of war, cannon, rifles, and side-arms are all interdicted together. For look you, we are all in the same boat. If the private who levels his gun or spurs his horse against a foe is a sinner, equally so is the legislator who compels him to do it, and every man who in a dreamy optimism grows rich by contracts for furnishing the army. If self-defence is denied, if the instinct which teaches us to provide a strong police for the good order of cities and to justify the resort to force to subdue the violent and brutal, is wicked, if the soldier is robbed of the confidence of the non-fighting portion of the community behind him, then, unless miracles intervene, certainly our present civilization must be revolutionized. Possibly we cannot anticipate the results, but I claim that we should not be warranted in the experiment of such a Quaker revolution. Your policeman resorts to force, to

club and revolver, in order to conquer a stubborn ruffian. He is a servant of the law. He is a public benefactor so far as he does his duty wisely, and is conscious of the support of the right-minded body of citizens, for whom he meets danger. Now it seems to me plainly in the same line that the soldier acts. He aims to repress violence and rebellion and to resist invasion, or to carry on war for a principle that is of supreme value. Paul's words of obedience to established authority, you remember, included Nero, who was then commander-in-chief of the Roman Empire. "He bears not the *sword* in vain." The word *sword* in this text covered all the military means and discipline which availed for the security of social order. Of course there were evils, oppressions, tyrannies, and offences of all sorts in that empire, but taking the world as it really was, there was room in the saint's mind for this obedience to a power ordained of God. Christianity advances by leavening individuals, not by violent revolutions. It aims to subdue and extinguish the inordinate passions which produce war, and so to overcome evil with good. In a word, the point I aim at is, that in a free country averse as ours is by deep-seated jealousy to standing armies and intent on substituting for them a thoroughly appointed militia, we are bound to deprecate the mistake which demoralizes the inherent force in the people to defend the best interests of peace and quietness by forcibly awing and restraining the violent and corrupt elements that are antagonistic to good government. People have a right to live quietly under law, and law without sufficient force to coerce obedience is impossible. They bear not the sword in vain.

Again, the true art and principles of the military establishment have been obscured and hindered in this country

by a general notion that noisy speech and chance efforts of valor can be substituted for vigorous and comprehensive mastery of the art of war.

The "manifest destiny" period has passed. "Fifty-four-forty or fight" has vanished into the limbo of braggadocio. This practical blunder has lost favor, but not influence. It is a happy-go-lucky mood and habit by which we expect always to come uppermost. It belongs partly to some facts in our history, and partly to the separation of this country from the warlike kingdoms of Europe by three thousand miles of ocean. We suffer in some ways from our historical chances. We are a new people, with vast tracts of unoccupied territory; we are exposed to what may be called *a lottery spirit.* This creates a blind conviction that experimental democracy is a lucky system, and that errors in government can be condoned by spasmodic outflows of energy. Not many years ago Southern farmers had begun to wake up to the fact that democratic principles did not atone for wasteful agriculture, but that nature resented the old ruinous system of harrowing the land. The South is still disfigured by old fields and gullied hills that tell of wasted opportunities. We still incline to follow this disastrous method in the polity of the State. A happy-go-lucky spirit gave the opportunity to whiskey-rings and star-route contracts. We are now meeting the consequences, and begin mournfully to apply the old maxim—"The fathers have eaten sour grapes and our teeth are set on edge." They wasted the opportunities of a new country by reckless experiments and compromises, and we, like the prodigals, are picking at the husks. Especially is it true of our military affairs. Patriotism to be a virtue must be a *wise* virtue. Songs and processions and empty vaunts of "manifest destiny" and American almightiness must end

in ruin. There is an art of war of known principles, which may allow large probabilities in details, but its laws build up a nation in strength and give it permanence. Individual energy is good, but there must be wisdom in appreciating the laws of national life and the conditions of sound prosperity. Three thousand miles of ocean are a potent factor in our national problem, but it does not change human nature—certainly not such human nature as we are importing free of tariff duty. What has been, will be. There is nothing new under the sun in either hemisphere. A friend just after the war was amused by a conversation with a young fire-eater at Aiken, South Carolina, who was profoundly convinced that with three hundred horsemen like himself he could march across the intervening States and put New York under contribution. Perhaps he was a fool, but there are multitudes who are bitten by the same madness. We are all tinged more or less with this senseless pride. It is an inheritance and a miserable one.

Our war record, as a whole, has one blank chapter. *We have never yet contended against a nation which was in every respect our equal.* What a noticeable ignorance of this fact there has been in our people, and how deplorable have been the consequences! Every boy at the beginning of this century was taught to believe that we had conquered England in the Revolutionary War. Yankee-doodleism was the first picture of our patriotism, and while Yankee Doodle is a capital jig for pipe and fiddle, it is a poor poem and a dangerous philosophy. Yet

> "Yankee Doodle was (perhaps is) the tune
> Americans delight in,
> 'T will do to whistle, sing, or play,
> And (was believed to be) just the thing for fighting."

We may glory in the great facts of the Revolution, and

in the courage of the patriots, who, uttering their faith in the rights of man, dared, under all discouragements, to add works to that faith, and fight its battles to the end. We do not blush for them nor belittle their deeds in deprecating the folly of those who took it for granted that the millennium had come in the train of the American Revolution, and who changed the glory of its stern work into the likeness of a militia training. One must admire the grit and resolution of those revolutionary heroes, who, contrary to all expectation, came out of the struggle victorious ; but we are not to forget that its desperate resistance stood alone, and should warn us not to expect it to become the model of any future wars.

The War of 1812, scientifically considered, is to my mind measurably absurd. We went into it with prodigious confidence in gun-boats and pronunciamientos to assert a principle of resistance to the right of search. Single combats on the sea were fortunate for us ; but the most fortunate circumstance for us lay in the fact that Great Britain had her hands too full just then at home to give us any special attention. We were only too glad to get out of the scrape by deserting the very principle for which we began it. But it happened that we were far off from healthy criticism and the wholesome collisions of opinion with other nations, and so we lapsed into a vortex of braggadocio, and at home we hid the shame of our change of policy under the brilliant achievements of Hull and Perry. We were about as wise as the young man at Aiken. Many of us believed that with a squadron of gun-boats, and Paul Jones in the van, waving the Constitution at the frightened aristocracy of the mother-land, we could easily scour the seas and put London or Bristol under tribute. If you ask a proof of this spirit of irritated cerebration, you can find it in that poem which

required two authors to compass it, but which I can remember as being once the classic model which expressed what was then known as true, sensible patriotism. Where would you find to-day two poets as highly considered as Drake and Halleck, who could write such verse as this :

> " When Freedom from her mountain height,
> Unfurled her standard to the air,
> She tore the azure robe of Night,
> And set the stars of glory there ! "

What a rent was that, my countrymen ! Such poetry now would startle the readers of *Puck*. The piety of Francis Scott Key saved the Star-Spangled Banner from the charge of bombast, but I am not sorry that it was set to so extended a gamut as to keep it mostly for the use of our military bands. We have no national hymn as yet, and we shall have none till we have caught the tone of greater work and the music of sterner trials than we have yet had. We came nearest to it in those sweetly solemn lines that issued from a woman's heart during our civil war :

> " In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea,
> With a glory in his bosom that transfigures you and me ;
> As he died to make men holy, let us live to make them free,
> While God is marching on."

Again, in the Mexican War, we unfortunately were renewed in our conviction of American unconquerableness. But why ? The Mexicans had no confidence in each other. Demoralized by constant revolutions, their art of war was only a spurt of fury and individual cruelties Santa Anna ought to have given us more trouble than he did. He had skill enough and his men had fury enough, but they had no cohesion or order. Cohesion is the result of confidence, of national unity, and the recognition

of a power behind the individual soldier, which is an invisible defence and a chain interlocking all the links of an army. The Russians are famous for their cohering force, and therefore they surpass all men in making a retreat with the step and order of a dress parade. When the thin ribbon of British red coats shimmered up the slopes of Alma, in the Crimea, it revealed a trait that distinguishes the army of Great Britain from all others—the conviction that England expects every man to do his duty, and is quite ready always to punish recreants. The Mexicans expected no man to do his duty, and they were not disappointed. Hence, and without pretending to be a military authority, in fact, pretending to see only as far as any common observer, it is plain enough why Santa Anna failed to destroy Taylor's army on the field of Buena Vista, and Scott's at the pass of Cerro Gordo. By any rules of war that I can understand he might have done it. If the parties had been reversed, the Americans certainly would have done it. But however this may be, the immediate results of that war was to confirm this people in a miserable delusion, that lasted up to the battle of Bull Run. We had marched to the capital of a nation with a few thousand troops. We had gained victories over armed mobs of demoralized men, and had acquired territory from an unwilling people. Hence we were a warlike nation, able by our singular trust in luck, to spring up suddenly, like Minerva, in full armed omnipotence. Yea, we were greater than the classic lady, for she sprung out of the brain of supreme wisdom and force ; our maiden valor, on the contrary, was the child of militia trainings and political jobbery—and yet she had conquered.* The curse of this folly de-

* "The people have always been jealous of standing armies, and probably always will be, because the theory is, that during the

veloped itself in the fury and rashness of our civil war, when we had to unlearn it by many bitter lessons of defeat. Like two mastiffs, that had fought only terriers, both sections rushed with growls and barkings into the tussle, each convinced that things would still be as they had been. Mr. Seward's confident ninety days' prophecies indicated the common mind of the people, which had been trained by unrebuked brag to undervalue the powers and passions which were involved in the struggle.

Have we yet had the training required for intelligent comprehension of the conditions of national prosperity? We certainly do not as yet study the military art, and appreciate the principles of science that lie under it, as we should do if we had been once fairly pitted against an equal European power. We drift on carelessly, still believing in a "manifest destiny." One proof of this will appear under the next head, when we come to see how much European countries are sacrificing in military preparation, and how little effort we are making. But another proof lies in our general indifference to plain facts and necessary laws. Our navy is a myth, not so much by intelligent design and sound economic considerations, as from utter carelessness. Our merchant marine, which is the nursery of naval power, has become a

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time of peace soldiers are unnecessary, that when dangers threaten the country it will be soon enough to organize for defence, and when a call is made there will promptly respond from the body of the people a sufficient number of volunteers to resist and defeat the enemy. But experience has proved that whenever armies have been thus raised, the essential details of instruction, organization, and discipline were always lacking, and that these were only acquired after months of patient study and drill, during which period camp diseases usually killed a greater number of the willing patriots than the bullets of the enemy."—Prize Essay of Capt. George F. Price, U. S. A., 5th Cavalry, p. 15.

figment. We hear legislators who groan at the expense of West Point. We recklessly destroy the *esprit* of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. We keep up with difficulty the show of a national militia. Young men are indifferent to it, and older men begrudge the measures that will make it a power. We prophesy smooth things, and if trouble should come on us we should be found unprepared for it. Just here let me report what I have heard from an able soldier, who has been a member of the New York National Guard from the beginning. The facts in this case will serve as an illustration of all other States, which are even more careless of their militia. Until 1847, the militia law of New York was such that men were allowed to come out on training days with muskets or broomsticks at their pleasure, and all made it an annual farce. The poet Lowell gives us a picture of it in the Biglow papers. Mr. Bird o' Freedom Sawin, who was then in Mexico, is the faithful narrator :

"This kind o' sogerin' aint a mite like our October trainin',
A chap could clear right out from there if 't only looked like rainin';
An' th' cunnles, tu, could kiver up their shappoes with bandanners,
An' send the insines skootin' to the bar-room with their banners,
(Fear o' gettin' on 'em spotted), and a feller could cry quarter
Ef he fired away his ramrod arter too much rum and water."

About 1847 an act of the Legislature provided for the formation in the city of Brooklyn of a regiment with flank companies in uniform, and the others of any sort of form. Next the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Regiments were appointed, with all the men in uniform. Lest there should be too much attention paid to the military art, and business should suffer by this annual training, the penalty of seventy-five cents was imposed as the fine for absence. This effectually kept down any fighting ardor. And with this fraction of discipline the civil war came on. These

two regiments volunteered to carry their valuable discipline to the battle-field, and the city being robbed of their warlike strength, a company of citizens was formed to act as a home guard, and thence, in due time, came the Twenty-third Regiment. And it was only the other day that this regiment put off the old fuss and feather uniform, that looked so "killing sweet" in the eyes of the girls, and was really so killing hot and useless to the fellows carrying it, and it stepped out for the first time in a sensible dress for real work. It was an epoch, and the meaning of it is, that men have begun to feel that the old make-believe soldiering has had its day. If we mean business, it is, in my judgment, time to wake up more thoroughly yet. There was nothing venerable in the old dress. There is the wisdom of good sense in the new. Does any one say that dress is a small thing? Well, it may be, but just go in fancy to the Long Bridge, as you might have seen it once, in 1861, in Washington. We stand at evening by the Army of the Potomac on its initial march to take Richmond. So magnificent is the stern array, so gay the giddy throng, and so certain the victory over the rebels, that we hear that ball dresses are ordered for the festivity at that event. See the regiments marching past. What grand preparations of tailors and saddlers. What richness of feathers and gilt braid. See the very vivandières tricked out in their meretricious gauds, as if they had walked out of Demorest's fashion prints. The sight is glorious to the eye. Look well, for it will be seen nevermore on this continent. Let us stand again, four years later, at the central gate of Lafayette Square, on either of two days in 1865. Here come the legions of the same Army of the Potomac—men who are soldiers now in fact. But heavens! what a change! Or, on the second day, we look over the other

army, which made its way to the sea, under that Old Hickory general, Tecumseh Sherman. They come on and on. All day long is spent in the review, and the last ranks have hardly passed before evening falls over the proud, glad city which they have saved. But note there is no show, no sign of tailor's art, no display of gilt braid and graceful plumes. The flags hang riddled into rags, and the uniforms of officers and men are faded, worn, and dirty. The men are scarred and sinewy from long marches and fierce engagements, and nothing now is displayed for its fuss and feathers, but only for use—and it has had hard usage. But these signs have taught a generation the world over that these men can fight to the death, and can overcome mountains and bridge rivers on their march. They have coined names that will ring down the centuries, as our children learn to pronounce the words Cold Harbor and Missionary Ridge. Men discover now that there is sensible use and possible work for the national Militia. The tricksy glee and broad jokes of the old militia are gone. Men without knowing just what they mean are coming fast to feel that the art of war requires some proper preparation for exigencies ; that mere parade tactics and music and high stepping, with the left foot foremost, are not all that is wanted.

Under the next head we take up the statistics of certain matters that speak for themselves. We put in contrast the condition of our young citizens and the same classes in Europe.

These statistics cover the army work of the chief countries of Europe—its vast expense in taxation, its loss of personal happiness, and its immense injury to morals. And, first, let us look at Great Britain. Its population is 35,172,976 persons. Its standing army in 1883 was 242,-

273, and with the reserves added, 761,333. Its naval forces, officers and men, were 79,508—a total of 840,641, or well on to a million of men, whose business is preparation against war. Take out the women, children, and old men of that population, and one can feel what life is to the majority of young Englishmen, who are taken or are liable to be taken from their homes and occupations and compelled to bear arms. One can conceive how many men between twenty and forty-five in the mother country are bearing burdens of which our young men know nothing. The thoughtful reader can easily imagine in what traits a nation, thus trained, is superior in the art of war to a nation that considers this training a joke or a nuisance.

Again, the German Empire contains 45,234,061 souls, and has in its standing army 445,392 men. Add the reserves and there are 1,519,104 individuals, with 12,205 in the navy.

Russia has a population of 98,323,334, an army of 974,771, with reserves added, 2,618,300, and 30,174 in the navy.

Austria numbers 36,882,712 ; its army, 291,078, with the reserves, 1,072,299 ; and has 7,423 in the navy.

France, the *gens asperrima belli*, the nation once of soldiers, as she will be again, has a population of 37,672,048, an army of 502,786 men, with the reserves, disciplined and undisciplined, 2,423,164 (about half—*i. e.*, 1,330,000—*undisciplined*, yet soldiers of a sort), and she has a naval force of 45,747 men.

We need not pile up the statistics of the smaller kingdoms. Some of them are even more weighted than these are. These five European states, with whom we must compare ourselves, have a population of 273,285,141. The armies foot up 2,457,000, and with reserves and

navies, 8,573,067. These are all more or less non-producers—men supported and paid out of the resources raised by the rest. On the other hand, we number 60,000,000, or about one fourth, and if we were under the same regimen we would present a standing army of 614,500, and with reserves, 2,143,266. What the navy would be we need not mention.

I am not sighing for a standing army, nor for reserves, nor even for a navy; if we were so inclined, the expense account of this work would effectually quench such a wish. I am quoting these figures from a statement by Mr. Lewis Appleton, published by the *International Arbitration Monthly Journal*, January 15, 1885. The army and navy estimates of Great Britain for 1883 were £31,420,755; of France, £33,730,783; of Germany, £22,624,749; of Austria, £13,413,795; of Russia, £46,102,500—in all, war taxes alone, £147,292,582, or over $736,000,000. Vizetelly, in his work entitled "Berlin under the Empire," reckons the armies of Europe, in 1875, ten years ago, at 9,333,000 men, and costing annually £136,804,000. War has produced the bulk of national debts the world over. The national debts of Europe in 1883 were £4,602,389,994, and the annual interest £207,431,835. These are the facts of a year of comparative peace, and in that year the increase of national debts was £187,166,670. Even whiskey-rings, Star-Route contracts, and silver-dollar coinage are cheaper luxuries than standing armies.

There is another view of the subject which must be of extreme interest to all citizens, namely the vast expense of human happiness. Let us look at the militia laws of these countries.

In France the law that "all able-bodied males are liable to military duty from the age of twenty to forty.

The first *five* years are spent in the active army, then *four* years in the reserves, then five years in the territorial or district army, and six years in the territorial army of reserve." The burden of this law is seen in the somewhat grim list of exempts. The exceptions to the call are "the eldest of whole orphans, the only or eldest son or grandson of a widow or a wife separated from her husband, or of a father more than seventy years old; the elder of two brothers liable to service at the same time; the younger of two brothers when the elder brother is actually in service in the army." Other exemptions are allowed of "pupils, teachers, ecclesiastics, etc., and some few that may be made at the discretion of local authorities." Taken at its best, how many of our youth ever dream of such rules or would like to try life under such a law? Contrast our own condition. The National Guard of New York numbers twelve thousand men. The law gently provides that young men may be persuaded to join it, sweetly and subtly seduced into the ranks. They are called on for the least amount of time and effort of any young men in the world. Fancy what occurs elsewhere. The majority of young men are not invited but are compelled to serve five years in active army life, then four years in the reserve, in dock-yards and forts, all the while as common soldiers; then at thirty they are able to pitch their family tent, "a day's march nearer home."

Germany claims a perfect system. In that model region every man at twenty must serve three years in the regular army and four in the reserve; at twenty-seven he enters the *Landwehr* or militia, liable to regular drill, and in case of war he is placed in the regular army. At thirty-two he is enrolled in the *Landsturm*, subject to duty in case of invasion. The reserves may all be mobilized on call in two weeks' time, and the German law calls for an army of 1,300,000 men.

It suffices for the argument here to cite some facts from the paper first quoted.

The general principles now adopted by Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and some minor states are :

1. Liability of all men to serve at twenty years of age.

2. Selection by lot of those to serve in the ranks and those to be held in reserve.

3. Division of terms of service : ranks, on furlough, subject to instant call, and more distant call after the other is exhausted.

4. Depôts of reserve or feeders to supply the army.

5. Portions of reserves in regiments or armies in the rear of the regular army.

6. Mobilization, calling in all furloughs, feeders, and so much of the *Landwehr* as is needed.

This scheme enables the state to put in the field, in two weeks' time, a vast horde of trained soldiers.

These facts present us the spirit of European laws, and show us the contrast to the American system, under which we are living. Our American people received from their English habits a profound aversion to standing armies. The jealousy between the Federal Government and the States has perpetuated that distrust and confirmed the sentiment into principle. In 1792 Congress passed an act in somewhat the style of Augustus Cæsar, that all our Western world should be enrolled, and accordingly the old funny system of American Militia came into being. With entire respect for the known wisdom of Congress on all subjects, it may be said that the best symbol for the old militiaman of Brother Jonathan can be found in the figures of speech contained in the song of Yankee Doodle, and that his proper weapon would be

> "The old Queen's arm that Grand'ther Young
> Brought home from Concord—busted."

In 1795 the President was authorized in case of danger from invasion to call out the militia of the nearest States, as also to suppress any partial insurrection. These provisions remain in force. The militia at first could be called into service for only three months—that is, for Mr. Seward's ninety days. In 1862 the old ninety days' dream went glimmering into oblivion, and the term of service was then limited to nine months. The officering of the men has been left by these statutes mostly to the separate States. At present the majority of the States of the Union have recognized the need of an efficient militia, but have done very little to secure its efficiency. For thirty years the impression has been growing stronger, that an annual training and street parades do not on the whole make men soldiers. As doubtful a notion has been indulged, that this service can be left altogether to chance volunteering. Fortunately for us volunteers have on the whole met the needs of the country, and they have formed the nucleus of an army. They have succeeded in suppressing such riots as have occurred. The whiskey rebellion of 1794 was put down by a levy of four States. At other times the militia have done yeoman service.

But there is another side to the European system which deserves a word before we drop it—*its injury to morals.* Men are best and happiest in virtuous homes. Men are degraded by any temptations to undervalue or forego the home virtues. Look at it only on the material side of the general good of the community. Wherever a majority of young men are secluded from the ordinary avocations of life, and forcibly taken from the natural sphere of family restraints, whether by war, commerce, education, or religion, the results are injurious to the best qualities —to the rational manhood and sound stamina of the citizens of a free state. Paris and New York, like Tyre and

Corinth of ancient times, are somewhat infamous, because of the vices that follow from the occasional forced celibacy of commerce. Monasteries of religionists even have not escaped the tongue of scandal. I am of the opinion that the lax morals of Europe can be fairly laid at the door of the military regimen. It must be seen that when the majority of young men at twenty years of age are compelled to feel that they hold all personal liberty at the will and beck of a war minister, they must defer all plans of settled life to the uncertain future. Bret Harte has pictured in glowing colors the manners of the miners of the West in the Luck of Roaring Camp—to which the novels of a military character by European writers respond to a dot.

Therefore, letting the question of guilt alone, the habits of camps—exaggerated jollity, the bravado of selfish indifference, the epicurean cast of conscience,—in a word the Bohemian spirit that relieves the hardtack and bacon of the commissary with all manner of stealings and petty tyrannies, and the crimes of deeper dye that men wot of, such as we knew to be committed even in the District of Columbia during the civil war ; all these are, even in the lowest view, a vast loss and a general letting down and injury to a community. Riding to McClellan's camp just after the battle of Antietam and seeing the hogs and chickens around the farm-yard, I asked my companion, the Adjutant-General, what it meant. His answer was : "O ! these men are all *regulars ;* we can govern them." The next summer I was boarding on a well-stocked farm in the District. One July day a regiment of zouaves were camped on the place, and at noon the next day there was not an onion or a green apple left us. They were regulars only in foraging. We could tell of other and darker deeds which were only too true. Washington

people may remember the gossip in the city concerning Joe Hooker's Brigade. The losses in morals to a country are grievous. Thank God we have escaped them so far.

And now, with these divisions of the general subject, I appeal to all citizens of this free country to consider the situation and the duties issuing therefrom.

First, let me say that it is conceded that we are in little danger of a foreign war in these times. It is certainly very improbable. Canada has no cause for irritation, beyond what diplomacy can easily meet. Her relative importance has also steadily diminished. On the other side, the Mexican border is being pierced now by railroads, which will destroy the seed of past evils in that section. As to the Old World, the probabilities of war with us are very few. Now that an efficient war-ship costs two millions of dollars, and a single projectile of her largest guns four hundred dollars, war is more than ever a matter of finance, and when three thousand miles of ocean intervene, is too costly an indulgence. Again, oppressive taxation and increasing public debts in Europe are acting favorably all the while for our peace. Cost is a powerful argument for amity. History proves that war-power follows the scale of wheat. We are increasing in national wealth all the time, and the continent has only begun to develop its resources of provisions. Add to this the advantages of union and the equality of all men before the law, and we may consider a foreign war as next to impossible. Therefore, the chief dangers to peace are internal. The great evil from slavery, which threatened us for a century, was finally removed at Appomattox. Now, as we are at last settling down to regular life as a nation, or I may say, just as we have begun to settle down,—the dangers that are worth consideration are such only as exist in all states and nations.

We cannot escape them. They inhere in the very nature of a sound government, and they are at their minimum with us, because as yet men are able to indulge in all manner of noisy discussion. Free discussion has been our safety thus far, and will be for a time to come. Gunpowder when exploded on the surface of a rock is noisy, smoky, and dirty, but it leaves the rock uninjured. We have been able to give our explosives time to burst, and time is a potent factor against fanaticism and violence. Mob violence expends its force in folly, if you can afford to retard it by delay. Here comes in the science of preparation. Once in the French Revolution ten minutes only intervened between Murat's taking off the guns from St. Cloud and the messengers of the St. Antoine appearing on the spot to get them; and when that mob, till then invincible, appeared before the cannoniers of the unknown General Bonaparte—a man who knew the full value of preparation—it needed but a single discharge of grape to end the reign of lawlessness and terror. All revolutionists recognize the value of speed in sudden outbreaks. It is the first blow that cuts. Wisdom then points us to the chief danger of a free state, and the supreme duty of citizens to be thoroughly prepared in the art of war, that they may economize those first few hours of time. If the Federal Government had been ready to pour into Fort Sumter a strong body of troops and provisions, and ammunition in 1861, and simply *held the position*, the course of the last war would have been changed. I do not say prevented,—but certainly changed.

Especially in this one nation it should be a maxim that the Law should be always openly and evidently ready against violence. Our Law is our only sovereign. It is invisible; it has no insignia, no palaces, no interested no-

bility nor paid priesthood ; no special caste interested to represent it. The sovereignty in the people is wanting in signs that educate the ignorant and illregulated classes to understand that it resides in the people as a whole and not in individuals. They are strongly tempted to look at liberty without law, and they grow up in delusions. They find it hard to comprehend that it is liberty to obey laws which we have all passed upon. Now, there is no law where there is no power to enforce it. In the church we may trust to consensual jurisdiction, but not in the state. There jurisdiction must be coercive, or the state is like Eli, saying to his sons : "Nay, my sons." He perished, as did his sons, and as every state has done which has given rein to the sons of Belial.

To our young countrymen I desire to present one final consideration. In the case of ten criminals charged with murder, where nine escape by law, trickery, or corruption, and one suffers the extreme penalty, that one has a righteous anger against the law that slays him—nay, that murders him. All the advantages of justice are nullified by such partiality, and the law becomes a detestable tyranny. There is something like this which is true of a citizen soldiery. Equal risk, equal hardship, equal exposure, equal courage, and exact justice in enforcing the law, is the only thing that can soothe the wounds of the average man, who is called to suffer for the whole. It is sentimental to murmur "Dulce est pro patria mori,"—but the *patria* that a man dies for must not be a partial stepmother to make it sweet. It must be a country that is worth dying for. Because of this principle, we doom to death the sentinel who sleeps on his post in front of the enemy. He shirks his proper share of the common danger. This principle rouses the storm of anger against the coward and traitor. They are in the same category.

It is only when this principle is felt by all, that you have any thing that can be called an army. The matter of soldiering has been lightly taken up as holiday sport, or as escape from jury duty. Fancy for a moment what evil would ensue to the community if the juryman had no higher sense of his duty than the common militiaman. The weakest point in our American system is in this trifling spirit in this regard. We are told that merchants and employers are often inclined to look upon these duties from the point of the trifling inconvenience which it occasions them in their business. The Lord help them. It is shameful to think it possible. One might almost wish that they could be rudely awakened to see their folly.*

The riots in New York in 1863 cost more money in taxation than would keep the National Guard for twenty years. With such a population of diverse and incongruous materials as we have in the two large cities of New York and Brooklyn, it would need but one day's experience of mob violence, its wanton destruction of property and life, to make citizens see their folly. We certainly have not fallen on an age of miracles. The elements of discord are latent in these communities, but they exist among us still in the passions of brutal, ignorant, and ill-regulated classes, in race-difficulties and caste-prejudices, in jarrings between capital and labor, and in the vagaries of demagogues and

* "At this writing the defenceless condition of the sea-coast is well known to foreign powers, as it is the subject of debate in Congress. Before the important sea-coast cities could be prepared for defence, the ships of war of any second-rate power appearing in their harbors could exact all the tribute that the citizens might be able to pay." —Capt. Scott's Monograph, p. 20. It may startle the New York citizens to learn the fact that there are at least fifteen ships of war in European waters that can lie in safety off Coney Island, and send their shells as far as the Grand Central Depôt in Forty-second Street, and nothing that we have could stop them.

traitors.* Hunger and rags and injustice, cruelty and oppression, are not extinct, nor passive. Society is bound to laws that always bring vengeance upon it for wrong-doing—the vengeance of the God whose "mills grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small." We are told that a New York firm in these hard times lately ordered a superintendent to reduce the wages of its female employés. The answer was: "It cannot be done; they must starve." "Then turn off three hundred of them and advertise for apprentices without pay for three months. At the end of that time turn them off, and repeat the process." Is there not a Great Spirit in nature, that will visit for these things? Can any man believe that in a community where the rich are growing richer all the time, where the wages of the laborer are being held back, and the unthrifty poor always becoming poorer, a day of recompense is far off? You may multiply your churches and your schools as much as you please, but when at last the cry of hungry hordes who will not work, or who cannot find work to do, or who are victims of tyranny and greed, is heard among us—will it not be heard too in the ears of the Lord of Hosts? The great army

* *From the New York "Sun."*

ARMED SOCIALISTS IN OUR PRINCIPAL CITIES.—LOUISVILLE, March 18th.—Justus Schwab of New York, and A. R. Parsons of Chicago, representatives of the dynamiters, anarchists and socialists, addressed a motley crowd in Liederkranz Hall to-night. They are forming societies throughout the State. Parsons, in an interview, said:

"There is no doubt about there being armed men in training in the different cities. Our organization is about 5,000 strong, and we are armed. In New York we have a registry of about 8,000, and most of them are armed. Other cities are in proportion. We are preparing for trouble. Agitation will finally result in action, and then we must be prepared. We have no idea how soon it will come, and we must not allow it to surprise us."

of the discontented people, whether rightfully or not, is always being recruited, and fierce cries and fiercer curses are constantly heard among us. The military cannot right these wrongs, nor can it feed the hungry and clothe the naked, nor can it compel men to be just, but it can be ready to hold back the mad violence of raging passions, till men shall have time to think and learn that the remedy of their sufferings is in reform and not revolution, in just laws and not in anarchy.

Human nature being the same everywhere, the state must take note of the laws of its own construction, and must value the necessity of full preparation against anarchy. By the state I mean, "We, the people." Hitherto this arm of its defence has been left to voluntary impulse. May the day be far off when the state shall be driven to conscription. It is fixed in the nature of things, that a state must have power and efficient preparation to protect itself and to enforce its laws. Beyond the act of enlistment in a regiment there lies the conception of the duty of preparation in tactics, the patriotism of obedient and serious submission to authority, and that cultivated *esprit du corps* which creates out of a number of men an efficient army.

That which elevates an army above a mob is confidence in each individual company and each private; a habit of faith that every other one will bear his part of the pressure and danger of assault. The real courage that ifts itself above the bravado of the *slugger* is the trained faith of every soldier that every other man in the ranks will do his duty. It is this conviction, under just authority of the law, that hides and condones the butchery—that diminishes the sense of personal danger and creates the force that gives value to a military organization. The evening after the battle of Bull Run, Vizetelly, a corre-

spondent of the London press, spent his time with me. He had been on the field of the battle as an experienced observer. He told me that he had never seen any thing in the battles of Europe equal to the desperate ferocity of the engagement between the New York Fire Zouaves and the Louisiana Tigers. But that sort of courage does not make an army. I am convinced that the experiment is yet to be fully tried—and until it is tried much remains doubtful in our government—of how a citizen soldiery in a free state will bear the strain of an assault by raging thousands of their fellow-citizens, who have been prepared by a Catilinian schooling of hate, corruption, and violent infidel denunciations, when the test shall be made between law and lawlessness. Hatred, violence, and corruption are fascinating to bad men. They spring up like mushrooms out of a reeking soil. Beneficent law, wholesome restraints, and order are the fruits of study, self-denial, and reflection. They require intelligent forethought and preparation. Rage is a short madness, but it is a terrible one while it lasts.

Surely we are right to arm against these evils. There is a benevolence that is greater than hatred. There is a sense of duty that is serene in the midst of violence; there is a purity of heart and life, in loving and fearing the law, that can cheer the soldier who sinks beneath the bullet or the club of brutal foes—a spirit that seizes from the midst of danger the blessings of peace. Tennyson touched the heart of every English-speaking man in the familiar lines :

> "Was there a man dismayed?
> Not though the soldier knew
> Some one had blundered!"

And now to sum up. There is an art of war which, as the world goes, every nation must learn. I say emphati-

cally, *must* learn. We have long been playing at learning it, but have been doubtful of its morality, and have been tempted to make a jest of it. The nations of Europe give us reasons for profound reflection. The latent elements of evil in our own social life are suggestive of the duties of preparation.

What that preparation should be, is properly the subject for legislators and military authorities. My purpose has been simply to echo their previous statements, in the hope of convincing such as I may reach that preparation is wise, and, in fact, necessary. I can do nothing better, therefore, than to quote extracts from the essay of Capt. Scott, as hints towards so important a result. "The latest official data show that the militia of the States number eighty-seven thousand men. There should be a twelve-company regiment of infantry, six hundred strong, for each congressional district and territory. Behind this organized force are nearly seven million men not organized, but who are liable to military service. These men represent an abundant personnel—a great latent power, which would prove of little value in case of emergency. But a proper enrolment of these men, and the organization therefrom of the number of regiments as suggested, to be followed by discipline and instruction, without seriously interfering with daily avocations, would enable the United States to resist on land the combined attacks of the great powers of the earth." With this in view he suggests "a law to provide for the enrolment of all citizens who may be liable to military duty, leaving to each State the details."

In the appendix to Capt. Scott's pamphlet we have the opinion of four military men: "The security of the country is dependent upon its militia, which now especially needs encouragement and instruction, since the

improvements of last twenty years of the implements and munitions of war have rendered the occupation of the soldier, to which they must betake themselves, difficult to master."

"The army should establish and maintain, in so far as may be in its power, an intimate relationship with the State Militia, by friendly intercourse, professional discussion, and by all possible co-operation with it in its military exercises, that it may be instructed in military matters." "There should be more extended details of officers to universities and colleges, in order that a military spirit may be fostered among the youth of the land."

God grant us peace and prosperity! May he grant us too, that every man of the military force may grow into that calm and organized conscientious courage that comes of skill and order, and feel his individual risk to be small compared to the good of the whole organization, and beyond that, of the good of the commonwealth and country, that entrusts its safety as a solemn charge to his keeping. This is the test of patriotism. To secure this safety and continuance of social order is the object of training a citizen soldiery to be volunteers of duty and guardians of the public peace.

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